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Abstract:
In this study we model effects on Norwegian industry and trade patterns of the recently implemented
trade reforms - the WTO-agreement, the EEA-treaty, the OECD ship building reform and the EFTA
fishing agreement - through changes in tariffs, NTBs, government procurement and subsidy policy as
well as shifts in foreign prices and demand. We employ a highly disaggregated CGE model to simulate
the difference between an economy adapted to the mentioned reforms and an economy based on a
multilateral maintenance of the pre-reform trade system. Exports and import shares are modelled
differently depending on commodity characteristics. Labour supply and national wealth are exogenously
determined in order to focus on the gains from reallocations of given resources. The results indicate
strong effects on the patterns of industry and trade. Specifically, we observe an increase in the
production of services and highly processed goods, and a decrease in the production of raw materials
and less processed commodities.
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1. Introduction
During the last five years, most European countries have endorsed a large number of multinational
agreements on trade related issues. Although there exist numerous studies on the economic effects of
these undertaken trade reforms, as far as we know, none have focused on the simultaneous industry
and trade effects of all recently adopted trade agreements. This study is an attempt to measure these
effects for a small European economy - Norway - by considering the following ratified agreements:
(1) The EEA-treaty, (2) the GATT/WTO (Uruguay) agreement, (3) the OECD-treaty on ship building
and (4) the EFTA-agreement on fishing.
To identify trade and industry allocation effects, we employ a large scale general equilibrium model,
MSG-5 1 , based on the Norwegian National Accounts. It specifies a highly disaggregate system of
goods and industries and is benchmarked to 1991. CRS technology and perfect competition is
assumed. This is well in accordance with econometric panel studies of the Norwegian manufacturing
industries performed by Klette (1994), who finds quite small markups in all industries and no
evidence of increasing returns to scale. In the service sectors, we make allowances for differences in
competitiveness. To enhance the model realism, restrictions are imposed on production and input in
some industries due to political regulations or resource constraints. Trade in goods is specified in two
ways. Exports and import shares of most tradable goods are determined by Armington equations,
reflecting a certain degree of product heterogeneity. For more homogenous goods or goods subject to
highly regulated trade conditions, equilibrium net exports are determined residually on the product
markets.
A wide range of reforms are rigorously quantified, including changes in tariffs, NTBs, subsidies,
government regulations and procurement policy 2 . As the model is of a single country type, changes in
foreign prices and demand rest on externally provided sources, as well. Here, our figures rely on
results from two multiregional model studies of the recent trade agreements, performed by Haaland
and Tollefsen (1994a) and Francois, McDonald and Nordström (1994).
The model is designed to solve for an equilibrium set of prices and quantities along a simulation path.
We compare the long run solution of a path contingent upon trade reforms, with one reference
solution representing the counterfactual policy scenario assuming that none of the above mentioned
agreements were ratified, so that all countries would follow Norway in prolonging the pre-reform
trade regime3 . The scenarios are simulated with a common exogenous development of the total
A full documentation of the model can be found in Holmoy, Norden and Strom (1994). A more analytical discussion on the
stylised properties of the model is presented in Holmøy (1992).
2 For pre-reform domestic tariffs and non-tariff barriers, we employ a detailed data set documented in Fæhn (1996).
3This refers to the trade regime based on a large number of previously established bilateral trade agreements in addition to
the 1972 treaty with the EEC, the Tokyo Round of the GATT and the EFTA free-trade agreement.
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capital stock, labour supply and current account balance. This enables us to focus on the allocative
effects on industry production and trade without considering additional growth effects. The
implemented trade reforms seem to impose highly significant changes in the patterns of industry
production. Our study gives reason to believe that the undertaken treaties will increase the activity in
industries producing highly processed tradables as well as services. Producers of tradable
manufactures first of all gain from improved export conditions and lower imported input prices. The
sheltered service sector benefit partly from increased aggregate consumption as well as from
enhanced domestic competitiveness due to market deregulation. This is an effect from trade
liberalisation frequently ignored in other applied model studies on trade. A sensitivity test with a 50
percent increase in all trade elasticities reveals a pattern of highly robust conclusions.
The Norwegian industrial policies have developed much in the same way as those of other small
European economies like Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. Before the recent international
liberalising efforts, these countries also practised a highly restrictive pre-reform policy regime with
respect to trade in agricultural products, trade distorting measures in the manufacturing industries
were almost exclusively based on NTBs and the service sector was to a large extent sheltered from
foreign competition and was strongly regulated. Within the next few years they will all experience
the effects of the recent international agreements on trade. In light of these similarities, our
identification of important mechanisms may also have relevance for other countries.
The model is presented in section 2. Calculations of pre- and post-reform protection rates and
subsidies, as well as estimates on changes in government competition policies and export conditions
are provided in section 3. The results are analysed in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
The following description is based on a simplified version of the model. For a full documentation of
the system of equations, consult Holmoy, Nordén and Strom (1994). The model specifies 20 private
industries (presented in Table 4.1) and 7 government production sectors. We focus only on the
private part of the economy, where the main impact of the trade reforms appears. The industries
produce 21 tradable and 6 non-tradable goods listed in Table 2.1. In addition, 8 non-competing
import goods are identified. The motivation behind the classification of commodities in Table 2.1 is
the character and the degree of international competition. The set V encompasses commodities that
embody highly processed and differentiated products. The heterogeneity between varieties of
different origin is partly maintained by the use of Armington equations allowing foreign and domestic
4 Production and processing of oil and gas is not directly affected by the analysed policy changes. Hence we have chosen to
merge five petroleum related products into one named Petroleum Products.
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demanders to have destination specific preferences 5 . The classification of goods in V2 is based on two
observations. Firstly, they are to a large extent raw materials and less processed goods with prices
believed to be determined on the world market. Thus, net trade flows are determined residually as the
gap between domestic supply and demand, as in a Hecksher-Ohlin model of a small open economy.
In the model, net trade is determined as the difference between exogenous gross exports and
residually determined gross imports. Secondly, with respect to Agricultural Products and Electricity,
exogenous exports are motivated by tight governmental regulation. Commodities In V are non-
tradable, while 1/4 encompasses importables not produced domestically.
Table 2.1. List of Goods Produced in the Private Industries
Tradables where imports and exports are
determined by Armington equations (V)
Processed Food
Beverages and Tobacco
Textiles and Clothes
Manufacturing Products
Pulp and Paper
Industrial Chemicals
Hardware and Machinery
Metals
Repairs
Non-Tradable Goods (V3)
Domestic Transport
Onshore Construction
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Finance and Insurance Services
Other Private Services
Dwelling Services
Tradables where net exports
are residually determined (V 2)
Agricultural Products
Forestry Products
Fish
Ships
Ocean Transport and Petroleum Exploration
Oil PWorms
Electricity
Petroleum Products
Non-Competing Import Goods (V4)
Food and Raw Materials
Cars, Tractors etc.
Aircraft
Defence Equipment
Operating Expenditure Abroad
Selected Petroleum Products and Services
Others
Direct Purchases Abroad
Let V be the set of goods produced domestically, V = V I
 u V2 u V , and W be all goods,
W = V u V4 . In this stylised representation of the model, we assume that industry i produces good
i, only6. Industry specific unit factor demands Zhi are determined by Generalised Leontief (GL) cost
functions:
(1) C. 	P„,iz.	 h 	 0-
m DPhi g 
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hi
iEV, h,g.
5 This procedure is discussed in Robinson and de Melo (1989) and viewed in a critical light by Norman (1990).
6 The fact that most industries produce many goods generates a difference between the value of industry production and the
value of goods produced.
PLi = Pi W
'Ki = V;(1, 8 i , PFji )Pji
(iii) 	ph. = 	 (x
1
h..( 1 m 1.1p .11
11 JEW
 .1
i EV
i EV
i EV,	 h={.1,I,E}
The model specifies 4 primary inputs over the index h; labour (L), capital (K), intermediates (1) and
energy (E). Ci( • ) is the industry unit cost function based on CRS technology and Vhgi is the GL
substitution coefficient'. Factor prices Phi are defined in the following equations:
In (i) the wage costs in sector i are determined by a common wage level w adjusted by an exogenous
parameter ß that accounts for the base year wage rate differentials between industries. The price of
capital in (ii) is a function of the price of investment goods, Pii, and the shadow price of capital y
which accounts for over all changes in capital costs. In addition, PKi is a function of the nominal
interest rate r, the depreciation rate 4 and the expected change in the price of investment goods PFji.,
all assumed to be exogenous. As all inputs except from labour are composites of less aggregated
goods, price indices from (iii) are specific for each industry depending on the structure of input
demand. This structure is captured in the 2,hi; representing fixed Leontief coefficients calibrated in
the base year. The variable mi is the import share of good j and is extensively discussed below8, PHi
is the domestic producer price of good j and Pli is the import price of the same good. Perfect
competition in all industries demands that producer prices equal unit costs in equilibrium:
(3) pH = 	'Ki'
 Pli' PEP Si)
	
i E V
where si is direct net unit subsidies to industry i. Furthermore, import prices are treated as given on
the world market Pwi , but affected by Norwegian tariffs ti and N'TBs measured in tariff equivalents
te9.
(4) Pi/ = Pi w(/ + 0(1+ tf)	 i E .17' uv2
Household demand Di for good i is modelled as a function of consumer prices PCi and aggregate
consumption expenditure E,
(5)	D =	 PC; E) where pci = Pci (PiH,	 i E W
7 The GL substitution coefficients are estimated and presented in Alfsen, Bye and Holmøy (1996).
8 The fact that import shares are actually specific with respect to users, are suppressed here.
9 For Agricultural Products is however regarded as endogenously determined, due to a predominance of quantitative
trade barriers, see section 3.1.
where tic is an ad valorem commodity tax. Demand in equation (5) is specified by a linear
expenditure system where parameters are estimated using the latent variable method on household
budget panels as outlined in Aasness and Holtsmark (1993). Notice that the consumer is optimising
her utility as a function of an intratemporal commodity composition restricted by the budget
constraint EiEw PCiDi E . As earlier mentioned, export demand for good i, A i, is modelled by an
Armington equation:
(6)
pA
A = a 	 FDi 	where1 pi W pH i E V1
siA is unit export subsidies to good i. A positive shift in the import demand (FDi) among Norway's
trading partners is also believed to increase exports. The Armington elasticities, atA, reported in
Appendix 1, are founded on econometric studies by Lindquist (1993). All export of commodities in
172 is exogenous. Commodities defined in V3 and 1/4 are naturally not exported at all. On the import
side, the import shares of total domestic demand mi are also described by Armington equations:
(7) =
•
lap
i E VI
Here, the Armington elasticities, atB, are based on estimates by Naug (1994) (see Appendix 1). Import
shares for commodities in category V2 are exogenous. Equilibrium on the product market requires
thatm :
(8) X = —
.1 	 1.X -F
where (1-mi ) is home market share and au is the input coefficient of good i in industry j, defined as
ac.(9) a, =-- 	W, iEV,	 =	 /,
h	 aPhj
Assuming that there is no imports for direct re-exports, imports of good i, Bi is then defined as:
(10) B
 = m i
 (IjeliaqXi 4-
 )
10 On the assumption of no re-exports.
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Finally, to solve the model, equilibrium in the labour and capital markets is required, so that
	ac.	 —I, =	 I-	 = L
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K and T, are total factor supplies, of which Ta is a function of the population determined outside the
model and is assumed to be inelastic with respect to the aggregate wage level w. The current account
balance A is determined in the following equation:
(13) piA4 +	pilBi
ieV1 ,V2 	ieV ,V2 ,V4
By combining (2), (3) and (4) we find unit costs Ci as a function of w, y and the exogenous variables.
Since domestic commodity prices
 Pf' equal marginal costs, equations in (6), (8) and (10) for A i,
and mi , respectively, may all be expressed as functions of w and y. Furthermore, Di is a function of
w, y and E. From (7) and (9) we see that also Xi and Bi are functions of w, y and E. Hence, we may
reduce the system further by inserting for Ci and Xi in (11) and (12) and for
 Pí'  , A i and Bi in (13).
This yields:
	ac(w ) 	aCi (w, y) [ 	 ■(14) L. 	E) = 1 	 ' ' 7- (/ mi (w, Y))(P(wp 7, E) -I- / / kh.  _, 	 X; (w, Y, E) +4(w,Y)
	ieV	 apLi 	jeVir-.1,1,E fl	 1014 	 1
acia(w'T) (1 milw,y))(
	 a
P	 E)+1,	 Xj(WlYPE) +AiNilf)a(W,7)(15) K=K(-w,y,E)=	 p
jeV1w,I,I,E J 013.#
A = Nwy
	 = 	 (wyy)4 (144 y)
i€V V2
f ac (w, y)
-	 Filml (wy 7) Di (vti	 + 	 Xrn, E)
Levi uv2 Licfi	 JeVh=.1,1,E if 	 Orrhi
(12)
(16)
where mi and Ai
 is independant of w and y for i E W VI . Since the three equations (14), (15) and
(16) contain five unknowns, K, 4 w, y and E, we can close the model with exogenous values of K and
A. The exogenous current account balance excludes the possibility of economic changes due to
different "macro budgets". Furthermore, a constant capital stock provides us with a given amount of
resources, L and K, allowing us to only focus on the efficiency gains from liberalisation due to
reallocations of given resources.
3. Recent trade policy reforms
The reference path represents the Norwegian economy in absence of recent international agreements
on trade liberalisation directly involving Norway. The development in exogenous variables is faded
out to obtain a stationary solution in the last part of the simulation period which stretches from 1991
to 2030. Most of the exogenous variables not directly affecting the trade conditions are based on
forecasts presented in Ministry of Finance (1992-1993), containing the government long term
programme.
To enhance model realism, we have imposed additional constraints on either production or factor
supply in some industries due to existing political regulations or limited resource availability. First,
input of energy is fixed in the industries producing Pulp and Paper, Industrial Chemicals and Metals.
The firms have contracts on fixed amounts of energy at strongly subsidised prices and are practically
excluded from the ordinary energy markets. The contracted supplies of hydroelectric power imposes
severe constraints on output in these industries since exposure to market prices expectedly drive costs
up to unprofitable levels". Second, production in Agriculture and Fishery is exogenously determined
as a result of tight governmental regulations and marine resource constraints, respectively. These
imperfections are assumed to be active in both simulation paths.
Four international agreements comprise the reforms implemented in our study. An EFTA resolution
on the removal of subsidies that distort international competition in the fishing industry was
effectuated from January 1994. An OECD agreement on support to the shipbuilding industry that
virtually prohibits state aid, was to be enforced from January 1996, but problems with the ratification
still remain. The EEA was implemented from January 1994 and the WTO/GATT agreement from
January 1995. Both involve considerable changes in the Norwegian import regime, export conditions
and government aid, regulation and procurement patterns.
3.1. The changing import regime
Barriers on imports of good i are quantified by the good's protection rate or equivalent tariff (ET).
The trade barriers generate a gap between the import price (excluding domestic taxes), and the
I I For more on pricing in the Norwegian energy market, see Johnsen (1991).
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reference price defined as the lowest possible import c.i.f. price. The ET is defined as the ad valorem
tariff rate that would generate an equivalent gap:
P./ _ p w
(17) ETi = " =(1-Fti )( 1-FtP )- 1
Pi w
For NTB-protected goods, the ET will be determined in one of two ways: If the NTBs increase the
costs of penetrating the domestic border, as is the case of moderate technical barriers or price
discriminating procurement policies, the tiE will come on top of the tariffs and PI will be determined
by the exogenous variables Piw , tiE and ti
 . If, on the other hand, the tariffs or penetration costs are
prohibitive or if the barriers are quantitative, P1 will be endogenously determined by the demand
side12 .
Aggregation of protection rates has been extensively discussed in the literature. Basevi (1971)
suggested that weights should generally be chosen according to the focus of the study. As our focus is
mainly on the allocation of factors, it will be essential to analyse in what manner protection levels
affect the movement of labour and capital within the model. The Armington hypothesis implies that a
higher price on the imported variety will shift demand towards the home produced variety.
Production-based weights would capture the output response of this demand impulse. However,
protection of intermediates do also affect the level of production. These protection rates should be
weighted by each product's share in the imported aggregate input13 . The strict theoretical criteria for
perfect aggregation of prices in input-output analysis and the problems of violating them, are well-
known (see e.g. Morimoto (1970)), and these problems are exactly what we encounter when allowing
for many sources of impacts from protection levels to each sector's production". One and only one
weight will have to be assigned to the protection rate of a commodity no matter where it appears in
the model. Empirically, the effects from protection predominantly arise from stimulating production
levels of home varieties rather than from influencing input levels 15 . Thus, we choose the following
production-based weights in our analysis:
(18) 13i = XiPiw i = 1....n
where Xi is production quantities of all the n products entering into the model aggregate j in the base
year. Production is valued in reference prices and we obtain price components not affected by trade
barriers.
12 See Fæhn (1996).
13 Relevant elasticities, both on the production and input side, could also be included into the weights, in order to capture
composistion changes from the base year.
14 Complications also arise from the fact that several sectors produce the same goods but in different compositions.
15 See Fæhn et al. (1995).
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In the reference path, the 1991 import regime is prolonged throughout the simulation period.
Quantification of ETs for the Norwegian industries in 1991 are thoroughly documented in Rehn
(1996). The figures are presented in Table 3.1 in the column labelled Reference path. Only minor
parts of these ETs are due to tariffs. Agreements on free trade existed between Norway and the
individual member states of the EU ensuring the elimination of Norwegian tariffs on practically all
goods except from agricultural products. Free trade with Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland
was regulated by the EFTA Convention. A substantial part of imports from developing countries was
included in the General System of Preferences (GSP) assigning low or zero tariffs. Free trade
arrangements applied to 80 percent of imports. The remaining were subject to Most Favoured Nation
(MFN)-rates from the Tokyo-round of GATT (3.6 percent as an unweighted average). According to
the Uruguay Round, the trade-weighted reductions in Norwegian MFN tariff rates on industrial
products amount to 39.7 percent. The full reduction will gradually be obtained within year 2005. The
reductions will only have minor effects on the protection rates. The substantial effects are believed to
be related to an effective prohibition of NTBs due to both the WTO agreement and the EEA-treaty.
None of the mentioned agreements that were in force before the recent international trade agrrements
placed effective restrictions on the application of Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs), and such policy
measures were frequently used in the Norwegian import system.
The three most protected commodity aggregates were Agricultural Products, Processed Food and
Beverages and Tobacco. For Agricultural Products a restrictive import quota system combined with
a strict quality control system was in force, prohibiting the imports of main agricultural commodities.
Thus, ET on Agricultural Products is treated as endogenous. The WTO agreement turns all previous
quantitative barriers on Agricultural Products into tariff rates. However, the post reform tariff rates
on most of the products will still exceed prohibitive levels and only have a minor effect on the
average protection rates. Most ETs are hence still endogenous. The WTO agreement does not allow
the market access of any product to fall, and access must rise if imports corresponded to less than 5%
of the average consumption over the period 1986 to 1988. Lower tariffs on imports from LDC
countries will presumably enable Norway to satisfy these requirements. The reform will generate an
estimated fall from 71 percent to 65 percent in ET for Agricultural Products in the beginning of the
simulation period. Thereafter, the ET is assumed to be endogenously determined by the domestic
price growth along the simulation path16 . The protection of Processed Food was previously strongly
influenced by quantitative restrictions and rigid quality standards excluding semiprocessed
importables. Furthermore, several highly manufactured agricultural commodities were protected by
16 During the simulation period the endogenously determined import prices for some of the products are however expected
to become inprohibitive, implying that the world market price inclusive of the negotiated tariff rates exogenously determine
certain import prices. This opens for net import growth e.g. from LDCs, which benefit from concessionary tariff rates.
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the Commodity Compensation Arrangement between the EU and EFTA countries, ensuring
compensation for extra costs due to high domestic prices on agricultural imports. The compensation
was intended to exactly correspond to the gap between the price of domestic commodities and the
alternative price on the world market, implying no effective protection. However, estimates for 1991
suggest that the effective protection of the food producing industry was strong (see Fæhn (1996)). We
have calculated a fall in the average ET on Processed Food from 52 to 44 percent. Although this
estimate is influenced by several prohibitive arrangements, the major part of the production value is
subject to exogenous protection rates. Therefore, we treat the aggregate ET for Processed Food as
exogenous, as we do for all the remaining commodity aggregates. In 1991, Beverages and Tobacco
were primarily sheltered by technical import barriers and an advertising prohibition that favoured
established market participants. Both the WTO and the EEA agreement turn several technical barriers
on wine, beer and soft drinks illegal. They also prohibit the import monopoly on alcoholic beverages.
ET is estimated to fall from 45 to 28 percent.
Imports of Textiles and Clothes from most low cost countries were in 1991 met by high tariffs (17
percent on average). Some items were also strongly restricted by VER quotas". However, about 80%
of the imports of these products originated from countries with trade preferences, leaving the average
protection rate relatively low' s. Here, the removal of VERs and reduction in tariffs in accordance
with the WTO-treaty generates a 2 percentage point reduction in the protection rate. The ET on
Manufacturing Products in 1991 was related to a protection rate of 20 percent for pharmaceutical
products due to technical barriers and import restrictions. Also, we found evidence for collusive
behaviour in the cement industry, estimated to represent an ET of 80 percent. The 1991 protection
rate of 3 percent for Industrial Chemicals arises from an estimated ET for fertilisers of 16 percent.
The fertiliser market was characterised by monopoly power in presence of restricted imports due to
detailed technical standards. Hardware and Machinery were to some extent sheltered from foreign
competition by tariffs and technical standards. Finally, Oil Platforms were found to be significantly
protected through discriminating government procurement policies. For all of these industrial
products, the EEA and WTO agreements are intended to eliminate the possibility for nations to
protect themselves against foreign competition by means of technical standards, quantitative
restrictions, discriminatory procurement policies and market regulations. Hence, we anticipate all
these NTBs to abolish and only small tariff rates to remain, see the column Reform path in Table 3.1.
17 Norway participated in the Multi-Fibre Arrangement of GATT, which opened for agreements on Voluntary Export
Restraints (VERs) with exporters of low-cost textiles and clothing products.
18As tariff rates are calculated on the basis of import values and tariff revenues, countries of origin are implicitly weighted by
their share of imports. This is not ideal, as reference prices are defined as the lowest possible import c.i.f. price. The
discriminatory tariff policies of Norway tend to favour high-cost trade partners, thereby overstating the implicit reference
prices. The calculation of the effects from MFA-quotas have the same implicit bias.
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Table 3.1. Equivalent tariff (ET) rates before and after liberalisation
Goods	 Reference path	 Reform path
Tradables in V.1
Processed Food	 52.0	 44.0
Beverages and Tobacco	 45.0	 28.0
Textiles and Clothes	 3.0	 1.0
Manufacturing Products
	
3.0	 0.0
Industrial Chemicals 	 3.0	 0.0
Hardware and Machinery 	 3.0	 0.0
Tradables in V2
Agricultural Products
	
71.0»	 65.0»
Oil Platforms 	3.0	 0.0 
1) These figures refer to the estimates for the starting point of the paths. ETs for the agricultural sector are, as mentioned,
endogenously determined.
3.2. Aggravated competition in service markets
Before the implementation of the EEA treaty, the cross border mobility of services and capital
including enterprises as well as foreign acquisitions was partly restricted. Combined with
comprehensive governmental regulation, this resulted in inhibited domestic competition in several
service markets. The General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS, ratified in the Uruguay round,
as well as the principle of free movement of services in the EEA treaty are meant to increase the
degree of competition in these sectors. There is reason to believe that market power will gradually
decrease. We have exogenously manipulated a component in the market price to capture the price
effects of lower mark-ups. Changes in rules of producer behaviour are however not reflected.
The Norwegian Banking sector was considerably less efficient than the Swedish in 1990. According
to Berg, Forsund, Hjalmarson and Suominen (1993), commercial Swedish banks were found to be at
least 30 percent more efficient. The efficiency differences among the state banks and the insurance
companies were probably smaller. The study is based on data from 1990 when Norway faced a
business cycle trough with reduced credit demand. As the Nordic banking sectors gradually merge
into one large competitive market, we have assigned a long run mark-up reduction of 10 percent. The
Domestic Transport sector is large and amalgamated containing some of the most regulated activities
in Norway. In OECD (1995), the Norwegian telecommunication industry was shown to be highly
centralised compared to other OECD countries. Second, In a study by Norman and Strandenes (1994)
it was demonstrated that free competition on the market for air transport services could lead to a 20
percent price reduction on the most important routs. There is also reason to believe that the
production of ferry services (see Forsund (1991)), postal services and road transport could be
improved through increased competition. Based on these observation, we have implemented a 15
percent fall in the average mark-up in the Domestic Transport sector. Finally, we believe that the
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Domestic Construction sector profited from discriminating government procurement policy. In light
of scarce documentation I9, a mark-up reduction of 5 percent may be regarded as a cautious estimate.
3.3. Rules on governmental aid
Recent international negotiations on trade liberalisation have increasingly focused on the diverting
role of subsidies. The clearest example is export subsidies. In international negotiations subsidies
seem to be divided into two categories. Subsidies given on a lump sum basis to every producer in an
industry are not believed to affect marginal costs and thereby levels of production in a partial context.
Subsidies given as rates of production, inputs, etc. are believed to stimulate production at the expense
of unsubsidised producers, in particular foreign competitors. Apparently, only such subsidies have
been subject to concern20. The pattern of subsidies to Norwegian industries in 1991 (see Table 3.2)
was greatly concentrated on a small number of sectors21 . The utmost supported sector was
Agriculture, followed by Fishery and Building of Ships and Platforms. The 1991 net subsidy rates are
kept constant through the reference path.
Table 3.2. Subsidies to production sectors in 1991
Sectors	 Net subsidies (mill. 	 Net subsidy rate' )
ECU)
Agriculture	 1473	 42.8
Forestry	 28	 5.1
Fishery	 159	 11.0
Manufacturing Product Industry	 121	 1.4
Hardware and Machinery Industry	 55	 0.9
Building of Ships and Pl4Orms	 177	 3.0
Construction	 110	 2.0
Finance and Insurance	 -291	 -2.2
1) Net subsidy rate is defined as net subsidies as percentage of gross production value in the sector
According to the WTO agreement on Agriculture, support defined to distort competition is to be
reduced by 20% within 2001. The impact of the rules is uncertain, as the scope for interpretations is
wide. What is clear, however, is that support will have to be redirected. Skjeflo et al. (1994) outline
three scenarios, of which we include the one that prolongs the base year real subsidy level. The WTO
agreement also restricts the use of export subsidies to agricultural products, including several
products in Processed Food. As Norwegian agricultural exports and export subsidy rates are
relatively small, these effects are minor. The EFTA resolution on Fisheries is designed to eliminate
subsidies that affect competition between the contracting parties. According to the Ministry of
19 Our reference is Golombek (1991) where only relevant qualitative information is presented.
20 In a general equilibrium context lump sum subsidies do also affect the industry production level, through entrance
stimulated by reduced average costs. In a general context one may also draw interesting conclusions about the trade
diverting effects of subsidies to non-tradables. Further, if technology possesses constant returns to scale properties, the
distinction between subsidy categories is even less relevant, as average and marginal costs will be identical.
21 See Fæhn et al. (1995) for further details.
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Foreign Affairs (1990), several of the supporting arrangements in 1991 were in conflict with the
resolution. The agreement is believed to reduce the subsidy rate by approximately 40 percent. The
ship building member countries of the OECD failed to ratify an agreement on complete removal of all
government support to the Ship Building Industry. We do however anticipate the agreement to be
ratified in some near future.
The WTO and the EEA treaty also regulate government aid to the industry sectors. WTO defines
three categories of subsidies; prohibited, actionable and non-actionable. Subsidies contingent upon
export performance or use of domestic inputs sort under the first category. Actionable subsidies are
those exceeding 5 percent of a product's value, or which are designed to cover sustained operating
losses in an industry or a particular firm. Remittance of debt is also an actionable support measure.
The EEA agreement prohibits government aid which favours certain undertakings or certain goods at
the expense of other contracting parties. None of these rules are found to impose any additional
restrictions on the provision of state aid.
3.4. Changes in export conditions
Approximately 80 percent of Norwegian exports are sold on EU markets. Norway benefited from free
export of all goods to the EU and the EFTA countries except for Agricultural Products, Processed
Food, Fish and Beverages and Tobacco. In 1991, EU tariffs on fish products ranged from 10 to 30
percent depending on the degree of processing. In addition, the EU had and still has an option to
employ minimum prices and anti-dumping measures on Norwegian fish products. The 1991, EU and
EFTA tariffs on Agricultural Products and most of the Beverages and Tobacco and Processed Food
products were set at prohibitive levels. Some trade restricting measures directed towards other goods
were also available, including anti-dumping rules against metal imports and rules of origin affecting
the Norwegian textile industry.
In order to provide data on the effects of the agreements on foreign prices and demand, we have
primarily consulted two external analysis. One is by Haaland and Tollefsen (1994a), who study the
effects of the WTO treaty on global production and trade. They apply a 4-region (EU, EFTA, USA
and Japan) CGE model that allows for imperfect competition. The results from this study are
evaluated by comparing them to the results generated by Francois, McDonald and Nordström (1994).
They simulate the same effects of the WTO treaty using a 15 sector, 9 region perfect competition
CGE model where the EFTA countries are defined as one region. In addition, we apply some of the
data on the effect of EEA provided by Haaland (1994). As Norway is implicitly included in these
studies, as part of EFTA, we face a problem of double counting. However, for all of the goods in our
study, except for some petroleum products, fish and metals, this problem is of minor importance
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because Norwegian exports are negligible when compared to the exports of competing countries.
According to Haaland and Tollefsen (1994a), the WTO treaty will increase interregional trade
substantially, but will affect the regions quite differently. The calculated shifts in foreign demand for
each export aggregate i, (FA), is determined by weighted averages of the simulated foreign import
changes for each good as presented in Haaland and Tollefsen (1994a). They are listed in Table 3.3
along with estimated world market price changes. The most striking figures are those representing
changes in foreign demand for Processed Food and Beverages and Tobacco. The figures reflect the
increased imports of such goods into Japan, USA and EU due to removal of large trade barriers22 .
The increased foreign demand for Textiles and Clothes, Manufacturing Products and Hardware and
Machinery is first of all a result of rising imports demand in Japan and USA, due to removal of
protection.
Table 3.3. Changes in export conditions (percentage change from reference path)
Goods
	 World market price	 Foreign demand	 Export volume 
Processed Food	 -1.8	 74.4
Beverages and Tobacco	 -1.8	 74.4
Textiles and Clothes
	 -1.6	 24.3
Manufacturing Products	 0.0	 21.3
Pulp and Paper	 -1.7	 *
Industrial Chemicals	 -1.7
	 *
Metals
	 -1.6	 *
Hardware and Machinery
	 -1.9	 17.0
Fish	 -	 -	 3.0
Ships	 -	 - 	42.1
* As mentioned in section 2 and further discussed in section 4.2, foreign demand for these goods is determined residually by
the commodity equilibrium equation (8) due to fixed amounts of low price energy.
The exogenous shift in export of Fish is based on the WTO simulations of FMN, supplemented by a
calculated 2 percentage point reduction in EU-tariffs and NTBs in response to the EEA agreement
(see Bowitz et al. (1995)). Exports are unaffected by the subsidy reductions, since the price effects
will be of the same magnitude among Norway's foreign competitors. The 12 percent fall in exports of
Ships is a result of the OECD agreement on subsidy elimination. Due to low levels of support in
Japan and South Korea (see ECON (1993)), Norwegian export prices are expected to increase by
approximately 6 percent relative to the average world market price23 .
3.5. The trade reform vector
In terms of the model presented in section 2, the following changes describe the implemented trade
reforms: Import prices are reduced through reductions in the exogenous components, Pi , ti and tf
22 The effect of the changes in FD on exports presented in section 4.2 also appears to be rather consistent with the estimated
changes in exports presented by HT.
23 The response in exports is based on an export elasticity similar to the one estimated for Hardware and machinery.
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in equations (4). For goods sorting under 171, a reduction in these variables imposes increased import
shares (mi ) through the equations in (7). For goods sorting under V2, the mi's are manipulated
exogenously, taking changes in terms of trade into account whenever reasonable. We will refer to
these measures as the import reforms (B). Exports of goods in V1 are affected through exogenous
changes in foreign demand (FDi ) and world market prices ( Piw ) in the equations ins (6). The
changes in export subsidies,
 sf, are negligible. For commodities sorting under V 2, exports are
exogenously altered if the market growth or terms of trade are expected to change due to the trade
reforms. We hereby refer to these changes as the export reforms (A). Sector subsidies (s) that are
reduced in the equations in (3) initiate a rise in domestic prices. For sectors believed to become more
competitive through new rules of tender practices and government procurement policies, markups
(mu) are reduced through a residual component affecting the equations in (3), though not included in
the stylised exposition in section 2. The following policy vector sums up all the reform instruments:
(19) E = {B, A, s, mu}
4. Simulation results
4.1. A decomposition of general equilibrium effects
Although the initial trade reform impulses explain much of the changed patterns of production and
trade, endogenous general equilibrium effects on factor prices and consumption expenditure are
important for the results, as they influence the industries quite differently. To understand the model
mechanisms, we make a decomposition of these effects founded on the method of Holmoy (1992). In
terms of the reduced form model in (14), (15) and (16), the impact of the trade reforms on industry
cost- and demand components will be regulated by changes in E, w and y to fulfil the resource- and
trade balance constraints. Equation (14) implicitly defines E as a function of w, y and the exogenous
trade reform parameters in the E -vector:
(20) E = E(w,y; e)
Similarly (15) and (16) define w as functions of y, E and E.
(21) w = k(y, E; s)
(22) w = d(7, E; e)
Differentiating and eliminating dE gives:
(23) = 
(k'7 +1c'E E'y ) d (k'e +k'E E',y+
	 E
- E E i„	 (1-1c'E
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and
Ey 
dy +(d's+d'E ) de(24) dw = (1 —I d'E E'„, )	 (1 — d'E E'w )
(23) expresses the change in wages necessary to fulfil the capital market restraint, for given changes
in the economy-wide shadow price of capital or in the trade regime. Generally, w is influenced both
by the direct effect on capital demand and by the induced effect on E as changes in y or e affect
labour demand and will have to be counteracted by changes in consumption expenditure.
Analogously, (24) represents the necessary wage response to maintain the trade balance. Equation
(23) and (24) imply
(25) w = Key; 8)
(26)	 w = 8(7; e)
which in terms of Holm)), (1992) represent the capital locus and the trade balance locus,
respectively. The capital locus is defined by all combinations of y and w which for a given trade
regime fulfil the capital restraint. The trade balance locus is defined by all sets of y and w that keep
the trade balance unaltered. The location and slope of the two loci in the reference path are simulated
and graphed by the lac-curve (capital locus) and the 88-curve (trade balance locus) in Figure 4.1. We
proceed by studying the properties of the loci in 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 and how they are shifted by the
recent changes in the trade regime in 4.1.3.
4.1.1. The capital locus
The slope of the capital locus is best understood by studying the first term on the right hand side of
equation (23). First, we consider the direct capital locus effect represented by the partial derivative
k' 
• 
It can be decomposed into two effects:
(i) Substitution effects from changes in capital demand per produced unit, which, in terms of equation
(15), refers to changes in ac1 (w, 7)/apKi for all i.
(ii) Demand effects determining production scales for given unit capital demand. The remaining
elements on the right hand side of (15) represent demand components. The effects may for instructive
purposes be further divided into
(iia) an intermediate demand effect caused by the substitution. Changes in primary factor
intensities affect demand for produced intermediates per unit, i.e. the components
a.,h4 aci (w, y)/aphi for all i in (15).
jeV h=J,I,E
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(jib) a general activity effect from the fact that partial changes in y affect domestic prices.
This alters the purchasing power for given consumption expenditure, and thus real
consumption (Di) as well as market shares of domestic varieties, both at home (1-mi) and
abroad (A i).
First, consider the substitution effect (i) in isolation: A rise in y will reduce demand for capital and
raise demand for labour. To obey the labour supply constraint, w must rise accordingly. Second, the
increased aggregate labour intensity has the effect of reducing input of intermediates per unit (iia).
This reinforces the capital demand fall and w must rise further. Finally, through (iib) increased y
causes domestic price growth; Di falls, and so do market shares of domestic varieties. This requires a
fall in w to restore prices and restimulate capital demand. In sum, the direct effect on the capital
market from increased y causes w to rise if the substitution and intermediate demand effects
dominate, while a stronger general activity effect will make w decrease.
Next, the indirect capital locus effects arise through the influence of factor prices on the labour
market, which will be counteracted by changes in consumption expenditure, E. Changes in E again
affect the wage rate, depending on k ' , which may be analysed analogously to k '.,, described above.
The concluding signs will be just opposite: le E <0 in case of dominating substitution and
intermediate demand effects; k'E >0 in case of a stronger general activity effect. The mechanisms
behind the changes in E may be decomposed and identified in the labour market relation (14),
analogously to the above effects in the capital market. E adjusts to altered factor prices in accordance
to E'y and E'w . Through the substitution effect (i) increased y will cause labour demand to rise,
requiring a fall in consumption expenditure. The intermediate demand effect (iia) accounts for
discouraged intermediate production as labour demand rises. Less input demand affects labour
demand negatively, and must be neutralised by a rise in E. Finally, increased y induce domestic price
growth. This will reduce general activity (iib) and labour demand and must be offset by increased E.
Thus, E'y >0 if the two demand effects (ii) dominate, while E'y <0 if the substitution effect
dominates. Analogous reasoning lead to the conclusion that E' >0 if the substitution effect in (i) and
the general activity effect in (iib) dominate, as they do.
By summing up the sign of the coefficient determining the slope of the capital locus in (25), we find
that the locus is increasing in the (w, 7j—space if substitution effects dominate, while the sign of the
slope is ambiguous if the demand effects dominate. Demand effects will only be significant if they
disproportionally affect relatively capital intensive industries stronger than relatively labour
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in 100 in 111.2
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intensive24. Holm), (1992) identifies the only significant disproportionate effects to appear through
changes in the market shares (1-mi ) and
 A. Increased y result in market share losses for tradables; the
significance depends on trade elasticities as well as capital intensity in production. The higher are the
trade elasticities and the average capital intensity of tradables, the stronger is the reduction in capital
demand from this disproportional effect and the stronger is the partial negative impact on w to regain
market shares. The combination of moderate Armington elasticities and relatively labour intensive
manufacturing technology leaves us with only inferior downward pulling forces of this kind. Thus,
the capital locus slopes upwards, as graphed in Figure 4.1 by the curve 1CK. Both w and y are
normalised to 100 in the reference solution. Simulations reveal a fairly log-linear capital locus in the
relevant interval, with an elasticity of approximately 0.7.
Figure 4.1.
4.1.2. The trade balance locus
The slope of the trade balance locus can be explained by examining the first term on the right hand
side of equation (24). It will be instructive to relate the effects to the right hand side of (16). The
direct trade balance locus effect, d'y , describing partial effects of changes in y for given E, is best
understood by identifying four different sub-effects. The first three work through increased domestic
prices, and will all require a counteracting fall in wages:
(iii) The Export price effect accounts for increased price components of the export values (Pi' )
(iv) The Market share effect captures market share reductions both at home (1 -mi) and abroad (A i)
24 HolmOy (1992) shows analytically that in MSG-5 proportional demand effects are insignificant, due to the fact that there
is no systematic tendency for capital intensive products (in an input-output-corrected sense) to have the relatively highest
income elasticities. Proportional demand stimulation will, for given values of Zia and Zli increase demand for capital and
labour in the same proportion in all sectors,. The labour market equilibrium will then recover by a simultaneous change in E.
This will cause practically the same relative change in capital demand and neutralise the initial demand incentive.
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(v) The Consumption import leakage effect25 works through decreasing purchasing power and
thus import leakage in consumption (Di).
A last effect counteracts the first three:
(vi) An Intermediate import leakage effect originates from the substitution towards labour
demand at the expense of intermediates, among them imported, as y rise. Rising w
counteracts this substitution.
In the model, the last effect is inferior to the first three, thus d'y
The indirect trade balance locus effects work through changes in the labour market. As outlined in
4.1.1, E'm, >0, while the sign of E'y is positive or negative depending respectively on whether the
demand effects (ii) or the substitution effect (i) dominate. A discussion on d'E , i.e. how such changes
in E affect w via the trade balance, remains. Increased consumption expenditure will deteriorate the
trade balance through import leakage. To restore the balance, the necessary change in w will depend
on the relative strength of four effects analogous to those above. To restore the trade balance, w
would have to fall if the effects (iv) and (vi) were the strongest. Then improved market shares and
less import leakage from intermediate demand would outperform (iii) and (v), which have the adverse
effects of decreasing export prices and increasing import leakage in consumption, respectively. In
simulations, we fmd that w-reductions increase export value, implying that the effect of reduced
export prices (iii) is indeed inferior. The main reason is to be found in the rather large Armington
elasticities in exports. Since also (v) is found to be inferior to the remaining effects, d'E is negative.
While the direct trade balance locus effect (d' y ) is found to be negative, the indirect may be both,
due to the indecisive sign of Er If the demand effects (ii) dominate in the labour market, E'?0, the
indirect effect is negative, and the trade balance locus slopes unambiguously downwards. However,
simulations show that the trade balance locus is increasing slightly in the (y,w)-space, with an
elasticity of approximately 0.2 (see the 88-curve in Figure 4.1). This implies that the substitution
effect not only dominates the demand effects in the labour market, but also outperforms the direct
trade balance effect. The dominating substitution effect increases labour intensity and implies a fall
in consumption expenditure. Thereby, import leakage falls and allows for increased w, in spite of the
fact that wage growth has isolated adverse effects on the trade balance. The most important
explanation for this dominance is to be found in sufficiently low average Armington elasticities (the
non-tradable commodities pull the average down), which means that the increase in w have small
implications for the international competitiveness.
25
 Again, small substitution effects are left out, see Holm)), (1992).
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4.1.3. Simulated factor price responses to the trade reforms
Our simulations show that the overall effect of the reforms (e) shifts the capital locus downwards, as
illustrated by the Ic'x' -curve. This means that their initial effect is to increase capital demand. For a
given y, w then has to decrease to leave capital demand unaltered. As for changes in y, the significant
mechanisms are found in the substitution between capital and labour, as well as in demand changes
that affect capital and labour intensive industries disproportionally. Simulations show that the partial
effect of the reforms is to strongly promote substitution towards capital, both through cheaper
imports of capital and through reduced prices on domestic capital goods. The latter is due to cost
reductions primarily arising from lower import prices and mark-up reductions in the construction
industry. On the other hand, for given factor prices, the trade reforms systematically favour demand
for relatively labour-intensive tradables, while the capital-intensive sectors, strongly dominated by
Dwelling Services, are negatively affected by a crowding out of consumption. Although these
disproportionate effects dampen the increase in capital demand from substitution, overall capital
demand is still stimulated by the reforms.
The trade balance locus is shifted up to 8'8'. The shift is due to an initial increase in the value of net
export. Hence for a given y, wages must rise to maintain the trade balance. The direct effects from E
on the trade balance work through the channels (iii) to (vi), as discussed above, as well as through an
additional effect (vii) representing changes in the price components of the import values, 's in (16).
The export value is affected through (iii) and (iv). Although a fall in costs and domestic prices reduce
the price component (iii), their positive effect on export volumes (iv) is larger. In addition, export
volumes are strongly stimulated by the export reforms through (iv). The total effect on the import
value is not that clear. Import shares (iv) rise slightly as prices of imported varieties generally fall
relative to domestic prices. Furthermore, (v) and (vi) also contribute to deteriorate the trade balance,
as import leakage increases. The reduced price components in the import value (vii) and the indirect
effect from the labour market adjustments, which reduce consumption expenditure, do to some extent
counteract the increases in import volumes. In sum, for given factor prices, the import value raises
somewhat, but not sufficiently to counteract the growth in export value, giving rise to the upward
shift. The intersection of the inc'- and the 8' 8'-loci in Figure 4.1 represents the new equilibrium for y
and w, where w has increased by 4.1 percent and y has increased by 11.2 percent.
4.2. Simulated industry and trade effects
The effects on industry production and producer prices are outlined in Table 4.1. The reforms seem
to impose highly significant changes in the Norwegian patterns of production. Particularly, the
simulation provides some striking regularities: Activity in industries producing highly processed
goods and services is promoted at the expense of the activity in industries producing raw materials
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and less processed goods. For highly manufactured tradables, the effects from the implemented
export reforms explain much of these results, see Table 4.2. Increased private consumption is the
dominant force behind improved growth in the service sectors. Consumption is not increased by the
GDP growth, which is practically ruled out by the assumption of unaltered primary factor supplies.
Only minor changes are obtained due to reallocation of resources to more effective industries are
obtained. Rather, a general terms of trade gain allows total imports to increase stronger than total
exports given the trade balance restriction (see Table 4.3). Thus private consumption increases by 2.2
percent. In other words, the increase in private consumption is made possible by exploiting the
productivity gap between foreign and domestic producers. For some of the service sectors, more
competitive domestic markets also play a crucial role. The losers in the battle for primary resources
are producers of less processed goods, for whom the implemented reforms provide small demand
effects, aggravated import competition and increased costs through raising primary factor prices.
Table 4.1. Changes in industry production and prices with a sensitivity test 
Industry Production
value in percent
of base year GDP
(1991)
Production	 Prices	 Production
percentage	 percentage
	 sensitivity
change from	 change from	 50 percent
reference path	 ref. path	 larger trade
elasticities 
9.9	 0.5	 -6.3
4.4	 0.8	 3.9
3.6	 1.2
	 2.8
-0.1
	 2.1	 -0.1
-13.7	 1.1	 -3.1
-3.0	 1.3	 -1.5
-2.9	 4.9	 -3.0
0.0
	 4.7	 0.0
0.0	 4.3	 0.0
3.8	 3.9	 2.9
1.0
	
1.1
	 0.5
0.0
	
0.0
	
0.0
0.1
	 -0.1	 0.1
-0.5
	
4.8	 -0.6
7.5	 -12.3	 9.2
1.0	 -8.0
	
1.0
3.1	 2.4
	
2.7
0.4
	
-3.9	 0.4
3.4
	 2.3	 2.7
-0.4	 5.2
	
-0.7  
Consumption Goods Industry
Hardware and Machinery Industry
Manufacturing Product Industry
Pulp and Paper Industry
Industrial Chemicals Production
Metal Production
Building of Ships and Platforms
Agriculture
Fishery
Forestry
Petroleum Refining
Prod. and Transp. of Oil and Gas
Ocean Transp. and Petroleum Expl.
Production of Electricity
Domestic Transport
Finance and Insurance
Other Private Services
Construction
Wholesale and Retail Trade
Dwelling Services
3.3
2.7
3.7
0.7
0.7
1.0
1.5
1.7
0.7
0.5
0.2
14.5
3.4
3.8
5.9
4.0
11.0
3.6
9.7
4.9      
Consumption Goods, Manufacturing Products and the Hardware and Machinery are all relatively
highly processed goods that sort under 26. Their activity growth mainly relies on the implemented
export reforms, enhancing export demand. The adverse effects from higher domestic prices are
relatively moderate. Prices are only modestly affected by the substantial price growth on capital
26 The Consumption Goods Industry mainly produce the product aggregates Processed Food, Beverages and Tobacco and
Textiles and Cloths.
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goods, while imported and non-tradable intermediates have become cheaper. The simulated increases
in imports competing with the these products are also due to the demand shifts and the terms of trade
gains.
The three industries producing Pulp and Paper, Industrial Chemicals and Metals, are the most energy
intensive ones. The producers have traditionally been highly export oriented and have been able to
compete on prices due to government provided low-priced energy contracts. When the economy wide
wage rate (w) and price of capital (y) increase, factor substitution increase demand for energy per unit
production. As pointed out in section 3, these industries are assumed to absorb a fixed amount of
strongly subsidised hydroelectric power. Equation (1) therefore implies that production must fall. In
the Pulp and Paper Industry, this effect is small, primarily due to low factor substitution parameters.
Increases in domestic demand and in terms of trade, drive up imports. Exports, which are residually
determined by the commodity equilibrium conditions (8), are crowded out by domestic demand.
Activity in Building of Ships and Platforms
 falls, first of all as a consequence of the loss of
competitiveness in production of Ships due to the OECD treaty. This is counteracted by a shift in
domestic demand, primarily generated in the Domestic Transport sector. Market shares are however
lost to competing imports27 .
The extreme increase in net imports of Agricultural Products, which are mainly importables, is a
reflection of the exogenous constraints on domestic production, the strong rise in demand from the
Consumption Goods Industry and the relatively low reference level of trade. For Fish, which is an
important exportable, net exports fall marginally, due to enhanced domestic demand from the
Consumption goods Industry.
The four sectors Domestic Transport, Finance and Insurance, Other Private Services, and Wholesale
and Retail Trade, all producing non-tradables, are significantly stimulated by increased private
consumption. This is especially so for Other Private Services and Wholesale and Retail Trade due to
large Engel elasticities. The production of Domestic Transport, Finance and Insurance services and
Construction also gain from significant reduction in prices due to the exogenous changes in price-
cost margins. Furthermore, to some extent they benefit from reduced import prices on intermediates.
Construction services do however suffer from the strong increase in capital prices. So do the heavy
capital-intensive sector Dwelling Services, where production falls in spite of increased consumption.
27
 As for exports, the market share is exogenously decreased in accordance with changes in terms of trade.
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Exports Imports Net Exports Sensitivity results
50 percent increase
in trade elasticities
Exp. Imp.
Commodity
Processed Food
	
59.5	 14.0	 -16.3
Beverages and Tobacco	 61.4	 16.5	 8.2
Textiles and Clothes	 15.3	 5.2	 4.5
Hardware and Machinery	 8.7	 6.5	 -4.3
Repairs	 -2.0	 2.7	 -2.2
Manufacturing Products	 17.5	 6.5	 2.0
Pulp and Paper	 -5.9	 13.2	 -13.3
Industrial Chemicals	 -14.5	 2.3	 -18.1
Metals	 -2.4	 6.9	 -49.7
Agricultural Products 	 0.0
	 62.0	 79.2
Fish
	
3.1	 71.4	 -0.7
Ships	 -12.1
	 6.6
	 23.2
Oil Platforms	 0.0	 -0.3	 -0.3
Forestry Products	 0.0
	
4.5
	
12.4
Ocean Transp. and Petroleum Expl.	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0
Electricity	 0.0	 0.0
	 0.0
Petroleum Products	 0.0	 3.9	 -3.0
Non-Comp. Import Goods (V4)
Food and Raw Materials 	 1.7
	
1.7
Cars, Tractors etc.	 0.1
	
0.1
Aircraft	 5.4	 5.4
Others	 4.5
	
4.5
Direct Purchases Abroad
	
3.8
	
3.8
61.3
63.5
17.0
9.1
1.0
21.0
-1.5
-2.2
-0.3
0.0
3.1
-12.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
23.4
20.4
4.0
6.9
2.2
6.1
11.8
10.1
6.6
-17.7
38.5
6.6
-0.6
3.2
0.0
0.0
1.5
-1.8
-1.1
6.5
4.1
1.8
Table 4.2. Imports and exports (percentage change from reference path)
In the industries Production of Electricity, Petroleum Refining and Ocean Transport and Petroleum
Exploration, the changes in production are very small. So are the changes in the residually
determined net exports, indicating small changes in domestic demand. Net exports of Petroleum
Products do, however, decrease somewhat, as a response to growth in private consumption and
activity in the Domestic Transport Sector.
Enhanced non-competing imports are mainly due to higher private consumption, but is also explained
by growth in the Consumption Goods Industry and in Domestic Transport.
Table 4.3. Changes in macro variables' ) (percentage change from reference path)
Private consumption
Private consumer price index
Gross investment
GDP
Total import
2.2
0.1
0.5
0.1
6.5
(1.5)
(-0.8)
(0.5)
(0.3)
(5.9)
Total export
Import Prices
Export prices
Wage rates (w)
Capital prices (y)
3.4
-2.4
0.6
4.1
11.2
(4.2)
(-2.4)
(-0.9)
(2.6)
(10.9)
1) Figures in parenthesis express percentage change from reference path when all trade elasticities are multiplied by 1.5.
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4.3. Effects of increased trade elasticities - a sensitivity test
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 also report sensitivity results represented by a 50 percent increase in all Armington
elasticities. We only analyse a positive parameter shift, because there are reasons to suspect a tendency of
systematic underestimation, see Naug (1994, 1995) for more on this. One important reason is to be found in
the highly aggregated data, which may reveal strong variations with respect to heterogeneity. As hardly
none of the observed aggregate changes in the foreign/domestic price ratio stem from homogenous
products, substitution elasticities of the relatively differentiated products within the aggregates tend to be
overemphasised. Another systematic error is to be found in the import price data, where quota rents are
omitted. This might suppress import price fluctuations as a reason for market share variations.
A 50 percent increase in trade elasticities appears to have a very small impact on patterns of production and
trade, indicating a high degree of simulation robustness. Production effects of the trade reforms are slightly
modified both in the case of declining and growing industries. Yet, except from the Consumption Goods
Industry, all industry production effects stay qualitatively unchanged. In addition, the ranking of industry
specific effects is hardly changed at all. It is necessary to point out that changes in the industry pattern are
now partly influenced by the fact that the recalibrated reference scenario contains a different composition
of trade due to the imposed increases in trade elasicities. In general, we now observe a considerably lower
reference level of exports of highly processed tradables, whereas the reference level of exports is larger in
the industries restricted by fixed energy supply, as the crowding out by domestic demand is reduced28
For the declining energy-intensive industries, lower export reductions explain much of the
modification. As mentioned earlier, export in these industries is residually determined by the gap
between domestic demand and industry supply. Stronger exposure to foreign competition results in
smaller terms of trade gains and lower consumption growth, in spite of a fall in consumer prices.
Lower domestic demand growth means less crowding out of energy-demanding exports. For the
growing industries, the modified outcome can in general be explained by loss of market shares in the
domestic markets. Increased trade elasticities appear to dominate the effect of lower domestic price
growth, and the relative strength of these two effects ultimately rests on the input-output corrected
primary factor (labour and capital) intensities of the industries. As mentioned, production in the
Consumption Goods Industry is significantly altered with accompanying changes in the qualitative
conclusion. This change is primarily due to a considerably lower reference level of export demand
accompanied by only minor reductions in imports. Reduced activity in this industry contributes to the
few significant deviations in the patterns of trade. Since agricultural production is exogenous,
declining demand from the Consumption Goods Industry must be reflected in reduced imports (the
large simulated fluctuations reflect the small levels of base year agricultural trade). Furthermore, this
reduction in demand also strongly affects the imports of Food and Raw Materials.
28 The pattern of imports is only marginally affected by the recalibration.
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5. Conclusion
Our general equilibrium assessment of the recent international agreements on trade indicates that one
can expect rather substantial changes in the future Norwegian patterns of industry and trade. The
most significant changes arise from stimulated export demand and increased competition in the
domestic markets. Industries are affected quite differently both by the direct effects of the trade
reforms, and by the induced cost shifts due to resource constraints. The treaties clearly tend to
enhance growth in production of highly processed and differentiated goods, as well as services, at the
expense of less manufactured and more energy demanding products. Highly processed tradables
benefit first of all from strong export impulses as a consequence of considerably more liberal trade
policies among our most important trading partners. The service industries gain from improved
efficiency as well as increased private consumption. This qualitative pattern is fairly robust to a 50
percent increase in the Armington substitution elasticities for the differentiated goods. The strength
of the effects is however modified, as both consumer demand and market shares tend to fall along
with reduced terms of trade gains.
Compared to previous studies on the same subject, the model is considerably more up to date with
respect to national accounting figures and estimates on trade policy measures. Parameters are
founded on econometric estimations. The level of aggregation is more detailed, enabling us to focus
on the large variety of policy measures and mechanisms influencing the different industries. In
particular, the deregulatory effect on several service industries is explicitly modelled. Though the
sectors are mainly sheltered, internal contestability will be influenced by the new international rules.
Since the service sectors account for a large proportion of the total activity (see Table 4.1), reforms
directed towards these sectors also affect the commodity producing industries significantly. In many
CGE studies of trade liberalisation, the impact of trade agreements on activity in the service sector
works only through indirect general equilibrium effects.
For a large number of other European countries (e.g. Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland), the
structure of government intervention in primary sectors, manufacturing industries and service
production in the early nineties were quite similar to those of Norway. So are the nature of their
commitments undertaken in the recent international negotiations29 . Thus, our estimated effects of the
trade reforms and the identification of mechanisms through which they work, may provide important
information to a broad group of European policy makers.
29 Although EEA participation deviates from full EU membership in several ways, a Norwegian study revealed quite
insignificant differences with respect to trade conditions (see Bowitz et al. (1995). When it comes to trade conditions and
state aid in agriculture, the choice between staying inside or outside the EU may however constitute important differences.
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Appendix 1
The table presents Armington substitution elasticities in the import share functions, aiB and in the
export functions, CTiA .
Table A.1: Substitution elasticities in trade and elasticity of exports to foreign demand
Goods	 aB	 aA
Processed Food	 -2.35	 -3.68
Beverages and Tobacco	 -1.00	 -3.36
Textiles and Clothes
	 -2.03	 -3.62
Manufacturing Products 	 -2.53	 -2.77
Pulp and Paper	 -2.35	 -3.68
Industrial Chemicals 	 -2.35	 -3.68
Metals	 -2.35	 -3.68
Hardware and Machinery	 -1.00	 -2.77
Repairs	 -2.03	 -2.77
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